Contents
- I. Science and Pseudoscience
- Introduction
- Karl Popper—"Science: Conjectures and Refutations"
- Thomas S. Kuhn—"Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?"
- Imre Lakatos—"Science and Pseudoscience"
- Paul R. Thagard—"Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience"
- Michael Ruse—"Creation-Science is Not Science"
- Larry Laudan—"Commentary: Science at the Bar"
- Michael Ruse—"Response to the Commentary: Pro Judice"
- Commentary
- II. Rationality, Objectivity, and Values in Science
- Introduction
- Thomas S. Kuhn—"The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions"
- Thomas S. Kuhn—"Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice"
- Ernan McMullin—"Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science"
- Larry Laudan—"Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change"
- Helen E. Longino—"Values and Objectivity"
- Kathleen Okruhlik—"Gender and the Biological Sciences"
- Commentary
- III. The Duhem-Quine Thesis and Underdetermination
- Introduction
- Pierre Duhem—"Physical Theory and Experiment"
- W. V. Quine—"Two Dogmas of Empiricism""
- Donald Gillies—"The Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis"
- Larry Laudan—"Demystifying Underdetermination"
- Commentary
- IV. Induction, Prediction, and Evidence
- Introduction
- Peter Lipton—"Induction"
- Karl Popper—"The Problem of Induction"
- Wesley C. Salmon—"Rational Prediction"
- Carl G. Hempel—"Criteria of Confirmation and Acceptability"
- Laura J. Snyder—"Is Evidence Historical?"
- Peter Achinstein—"Explanation v. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?"
- Commentary
- V. Confirmation and Relevance: Bayesian Approaches
- Introduction
- Wesley C. Salmon—"Rationality and Objectivity in Science or Tom Kuhn Meets Tom Bayes"
- Clark Glymour—"Why I Am Not a Bayesian"
- Paul Horwich—"Wittgensteinian Bayesianism"
- Commentary
- VI. Models of Explanation
- Introduction
- Rudolf Carnap—"The Value of Laws: Explanation and Prediction"
- Carl G. Hempel—"Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation"
- Carl G. Hempel—"The Thesis of Structural Identity"
- Carl G. Hempel—"Inductive-Statistical Explanation"
- David-Hillel Ruben—"Arguments, Laws, and Explanation"
- Peter Railton—"A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation"
- Commentary
- VII. Laws of Nature
- Introduction
- A. J. Ayer—"What is a Law of Nature?"
- Fred I. Dretske—"Laws of Nature"
- D. H. Mellor—"Necessities and Universals in Natural Laws"
- Nancy Cartwright—"Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?"
- Commentary
- VIII. Intertheoretic Reduction
- Introduction
- Ernest Nagel—"Issues in the Logic of Reductive Explanations"
- Paul K. Feyerabend—"How to Be a Good Empiricist"
- Thomas Nickles—"Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction"
- Philip Kitcher—"1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences"
- Commentary
- IX. Empiricism and Scientific Realism
- Introduction
- Grover Maxwell—"The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities"
- Bas C. van Fraassen—"Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism"
- Alan Musgrave—"Realism versus Constructive Empiricism"
- Larry Laudan—"A Confutation of Convergent Realism"
- James Robert Brown—"Explaining the Success of Science"
- Ian Hacking—"Experimentation and Scientific Realism"
- David B. Resnick—"Hacking’s Experimental Realism"
- Arthur Fine—"The Natural Ontological Attitude"
- Alan Musgrave—"NOA’s Ark—Fine for Realism"
- Commentary
Copyright © 2005, W. W. Norton & Company. All rights reserved.
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