Contents
- Introduction
- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Part I: Representing Games
- Chapter 2: The Extensive Form
- Chapter 3: Strategies
- Chapter 4: The Normal Form
- Chapter 5: Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,Expected Utility
- Part II: Analyzing Behavior in Static Settings
- Chapter 6: Dominance and Best Response
- Chapter 7: Rationalizability/Iterate Response
- Chapter 8: Location, Partnership
- Chapter 9: Congruous Strategies and Nash Equilibrium
- Chapter 10: Oligopoly, Tariffs, Crime and Punishment
- Chapter 11: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- Chapter 12: Strictly Competitive Games and Security Strategies
- Chapter 13: Contract, Law, and Enforcement in Static Settings
- Part III: Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Settings
- Chapter 14: Details of the Extensive Form
- Chapter 15: Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
- Chapter 16: Topics in Industrial Organization
- Chapter 17: Parlor Games
- Chapter 18: Bargaining Problems
- Chapter 19: Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games
- Chapter 20: Games with Joint Decisions- Negotiation Equilibrium
- Chapter 21: Investment, Hold-Up, and Ownership
- Chapter 22: Repeated Games and Reputation
- Chapter 23: Collusion, Trade Agreements, Goodwill
- Part IV: Information
- Chapter 24: Random Events and Incomplete Information
- Chapter 25: Risk and Incentives in Contracting
- Chapter 26: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Rationalizability
- Chapter 27: Trade with Incomplete Information
- Chapter 28: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- Chapter 29: Job Market Signaling, Reputation
- Part V: Appendix
- A: Review of Mathematics
- B: The Mathematics of Rationalizability
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