Principle #1: All political behavior has a purpose.
The development of bureaucratic agencies is subject to both the goals of bureaucrats and the goals of the Members of Congress who create and fund agencies, departments, and programs.
In pursuit of their goals to be re-elected, attain influence, and make good public policy, members of Congress face powerful incentives to expand and protect the bureaucracies that benefit their districts.
How do bureaucratic goals of maintaining (or expanding) an agency or department’s budget and influence combine with the goals of members of Congress to create a logic of incrementalist policymaking?
Economist Charles E. Lindblom argued that American public policy making is incremental; that is, policies change slowly over time.
Incremental changes in public policy have both a policy logic and a political logic.
Policy logic -> Incrementalism serves to promote stable, accretive policy development. As a result of this pattern of policy development, the government (theoretically at least) slowly hones in (by making what Lindblom called “successive limited comparisons) on the ideal policy program and level of spending. Political logic -> This stable development of policy also serves the political goals of policy-makers. Members of Congress like bringing home projects and federal funds to their districts. Indeed, with each successive year, Members can bring more government funds and benefits to their constituents and, in turn, shore up their prospects for reelection.
Policy logic -> Incrementalism serves to promote stable, accretive policy development. As a result of this pattern of policy development, the government (theoretically at least) slowly hones in (by making what Lindblom called “successive limited comparisons) on the ideal policy program and level of spending.
Political logic -> This stable development of policy also serves the political goals of policy-makers. Members of Congress like bringing home projects and federal funds to their districts. Indeed, with each successive year, Members can bring more government funds and benefits to their constituents and, in turn, shore up their prospects for reelection.
Still, a shortcoming of incremental policymaking is that it cannot keep pace with quick and drastic changes.
During the Cold War, the United States appropriated massive amounts of federal dollars to build up the military.
Policy logic -> In a time of perpetual “war” and a race between the United States and the Soviet Union for military superiority, important policy goals were met by the military build up. Political logic -> At the same time, Members of Congress would run for re-election by claiming credit for establishing, maintaining, and expanding military bases in their congressional districts.
Policy logic -> In a time of perpetual “war” and a race between the United States and the Soviet Union for military superiority, important policy goals were met by the military build up.
Political logic -> At the same time, Members of Congress would run for re-election by claiming credit for establishing, maintaining, and expanding military bases in their congressional districts.
The cooling off of the Cold War and the eventual demise of the Soviet Union led to a widespread recognition that America had more military bases than it needed and that the government could save billions of dollars by closing obsolete bases.
Still, because of the political logic of incrementalism and Members’ goals to be re-elected, few members wanted to close military bases in their own districts.
Question 1: How did the Cold War provide for a congruence of House members’ and Senators’ goals of good public policy and re-election?
Question 2: How did the fall of the Soviet Union and the decline of the Cold War threat lead to a conflict in members’ policy and political goals?
Question 3: How might the political logic of incrementalism get in the way of the government adequately responding to the changed policy context? What happens when the goal of maintaining good policy is not reinforced by politics but rather is in conflict?
In the late 1980s, Congress finally sought to close obsolete military bases. How did they overcome the political dilemma to achieve this?
BASE CLOSURES, 1988
Base Closures and Realignments
Total number of closures -> 91 Total number of realignments -> 54
Closures Affecting More than 100 Employees
Total number -> 25 Democratic House members -> 16 Republican House members -> 9 Estimated Savings (20-year period) -> $5,333,000,000
Source: Mike Mills, “Base Closings: The Political Pain is Limited” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 12/31/1988, pp. 3625-9. Data compiled by author.
Principle #2: All politics is collective action and the impediments to the collective action problem must be overcome.
The savings of over $5.3 billion constitute a considerable collective public good to be achieved by closing the 25 military bases. But Members of Congress do not want bases in their own congressional districts to close.
As Political Scientist Kenneth R. Mayer wrote, “Military bases are a classic example of a ‘collective dilemma’ … Individual legislators who rationally pursue their own interests want to protect bases in their districts, even though the collective result of that behavior – a bloated and costly base system – is something none of them prefer … The conventional wisdom holds that base closures end congressional careers, and few legislators are willing to sacrifice themselves” (p. 396)
How do you overcome the collective action problem when many individual members have incentives to keep the bases open?
Principle #4: Political Outcomes are the products of individual preferences and institutional procedures
Congress established special procedures that would make it impossible for individual members to pursue their individual reelection motivations by protecting their individual bases.
a) Congress named a “Commission on Base Realignment and Closure” that recommended these bases for closures and established a list of bases to be closed; b) Congress provided that it could not amend the Base Closing Commission’s list but rather had to vote to either approve or disapprove the list in its entirety.
a) Congress named a “Commission on Base Realignment and Closure” that recommended these bases for closures and established a list of bases to be closed;
b) Congress provided that it could not amend the Base Closing Commission’s list but rather had to vote to either approve or disapprove the list in its entirety.
Congress sought to “bundle” all of the base closures to keep individual members from trying to protect their districts. In doing so, Congress also provided protection for members from their districts.
Question 4: How would the establishment of a military base closing panel help overcome the problem of collective action and help Congress to respond to the changed foreign policy environment?
Question 5: Why would Members of Congress sacrifice their autonomy on making military policy by establishing such a commission?
Question 6: If establishing such a commission made it more difficult for members to achieve their reelection goals, why would they support it?
