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International Security Question StringMissile Defense and the ABM TreatyIn the spring of 2001, President George W. Bush committed the United States to the development of ballistic missile defense technology capable of protecting the entire United States as well as allies and troops stationed abroad against missile attack. National missile defense, however, is banned by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), an agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. To gain background on this ongoing problem, listen to and read President George W. Bush's speech on missile defense, read the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, read press coverage of the issue, and watch a taped video conference on missile defense. Prior to President Bush's missile defense speech, most U.S. allies, Russia, and China, referred to the ABM Treaty as "a cornerstone of strategic stability," and they expressed hesitancy about any plans that would call the treaty into question. Both domestic and international arms control advocates cautioned that violation of the ABM treaty could lead to an unraveling of the entire nonproliferation regime that prevents the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In the face of this opposition, why did President Bush state, ". . . we must move beyond the constraints of the thirty-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present, or point us to the future"?
Assessing external threats to a country is difficult. Accurate intelligence is needed about military capabilities, which most countries try to keep secret. India, for example, was able to keep its preparations and tests of its nuclear weapons secret until the devices were actually exploded. An assessment of intentions and goals must also be made, since the capabilities of allies are not viewed in the same light as the capabilities of potential enemies. Disputes over intelligence estimates, therefore, are not unusual. One reason why the George W. Bush administration may have preferred the commission's estimate is that the head of the congressional commission was Donald Rumsfeld, who became the Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush administration. For more information, read the Declassified Summary of 1999 National Intelligence Estimate. Which lens do you think provides the best focus for determining the George W. Bush administration's assessment of missile threats and its decision to move beyond the ABM treaty?
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The First Lens focuses on key individuals. On the issue of missile defense, focus would be on national security policy makers such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. You would discover that all three have long believed that the threat from missiles is serious. Each had questioned in the past the robustness of deterrence, particularly against authoritarian leaders not subject to public opinion or democratic constraints. Each had expressed belief in the notion that technology could advance sufficiently to provide effective defense. Thus, each personally was inclined to accept the commission's more threatening assessment, in part, because it was in line with their own beliefs. When considering these three individuals as a team, political psychologists might argue that individual preferences reinforced the group consensus to move forward with missile defense and encouraged the group to discount alternative views. The concerns of arms-control advocates, warnings from allies, and skepticism from scientists could be minimized by a predisposition in favor of missile defense. See how these individuals present themselves and their views: BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
The Second Lens directs attention toward bureaucratic politics and other domestic variables. Agencies of the government compete with each other for the attention of key decision makers. While the First Lens focuses on individual decision making, the Second Lens highlights why some agencies and positions may have more influence than others. It is important to know that Donald Rumsfeld personally believes that missile defenses are necessary because of external threats to the United States. But to explain the George W. Bush administration's decision to move forward on missile defense, it may be more significant to recognize that the chair of the commission to assess missile threats became the Secretary of Defense. In terms of bureaucratic politics, Donald Rumsfeld is a powerful player. Analysis of his position and his credibility on the subject matter relative to other's inside and outside government may provide a Second-Lens answer to why missile defense became a priority of the George W. Bush administration. A Second-Lens focus on bureaucratic position and players suggests that if Rumsfeld, who has corporate executive experience, had been made Commerce Secretary rather than Secretary of Defense, a priority might not have been placed on missile defense. His role and position are key explanatory variables. BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
In August 1998, North Korea surprised most of the U.S. intelligence community by launching the ballistic missile Taepo Dong-1 over Japan. Although the North Koreans claimed that this launch was an attempt to place a satellite in orbit, most observers saw it as a test of intercontinental ballistic missile capability. This test indicated that North Korea had a much more advanced missile capability than previously had been known. This was strong empirical evidence in support of the commission's more threatening assessment and undercut other assessments that had assumed it would be many more years before states like North Korea would have this capability. Which lens explains how North Korea's actions affected U.S. decision making on missile defense?
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Although the Third Lens begins with a view of the overall distribution of capabilities, analysis can be expanded to assess the balance of threats facing the United States. A key question for explaining the George W. Bush decision is whether the actions, practices, or intentions of countries that possess ballistic missiles reveal an inclination to harm the United States. The George W. Bush administration may conclude that the external environment is so threatening that major changes in the U.S. approach to international security must take place. President Bush stated in his address that "Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world's least-responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors, and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in strategic parts of the world". The implication of the president's speech is that there is something so different about the strategic environment that rules established in 1972 are now dangerous. The Third Lens reveals a focus on the "rogue state threat" as a driving force behind the George W. Bush administration's decision. BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
The Second Lens examines the interplay among U.S. actors involved with missile defense policy. In the summer of 1998, the U.S. Congress was under the control of the Republican Party, which was strongly in favor of missile defense. The president was Bill Clinton, a Democrat, who was inclined to support arms control limits on weapons rather than to build defenses. The North Korean test came one month after the release of the congressional commission's report, which had indicated a growing missile threat from rogue states. The surprise development of an actual rogue state test gave the report enormous credibility and greatly undermined those in Washington who wanted to reject or discount the commission's negative assessment. It was politically impossible for President Clinton to say that there was no threat and, thus, the idea of building a defense against undeterred attacks gained political momentum. In 1999 the Republican Congress passed the National Missile Defense Act with little political opposition. With an eye on the 2000 presidential and congressional elections, President Clinton signed the bill. Thus, a Second-Lens analysis suggests that while external capabilities and security environments are important, the key to explaining U.S. actions lies in understanding the domestic politics of missile defense. A full Second-Lens assessment would examine the political calculations of Democrats in an election year concerned that they would look weak on defense if they did not at least support research on missile defense. There was little debate between the presidential candidates on the issue during the 2000 campaign, so when the George W. Bush administration came to power, it inherited a domestic political climate not opposed to missile defense. This made it possible to advance a policy that most of the world opposes. BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
In 1972 when the United States and Soviet Union signed the ABM Treaty banning national missile defenses, they did so for several reasons. First, given the enormous size of both superpowers' nuclear arsenals it was determined that any defense could be easily overwhelmed. Second, the technology available was limited. Third, neither side wanted an arms race in defensive capabilities. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, deterrence was seen as a stable security strategy. There was also general domestic political support for arms control. Today, the United States no longer faces thousands of nuclear warheads, although there is concern about nuclear proliferation in small states. There has been little progress on missile defense technology and any possible future deployment will be extremely costly. The international as well as domestic political support for arms control has remained high. A quick comparison suggests as weak a rationale today as in 1972 for missile defense. So why is the George W. Bush administration so committed to building a missile defense, when the Republican administration of Richard Nixon signed the ABM Treaty? For some perspectives, view a PowerPoint presentation on "The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States" and Skim through an on-line book, America At Risk: The Citizen's Guide to Missile Defense.
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According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in the Department of Defense, the United States has spent $56 billion on missile defense between 1983 and 2000. Work, however, on the concept of missile defense dates back to the early 1950s, and estimates of total expenditures on missile defense programs are in the $100 billion range. Critics point out that all of this money has produced very little. The system of ground-launched interceptors failed in two of the three tests conducted before 2001. Missile defense research programs, however, are greatly aided by the fact that there is an institutional champion for the program inside the government that can maintain support in Congress. What lens would focus on the organizational interests of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization as a causal variable in explaining why the United States seeks to move beyond the ABM Treaty? To understand this background better, read "Countdown to Collision: Inside the Testing of the National Missile Defense", view a historical timeline of ballistic missile defense efforts, and read fact sheets on overall National, Theater, and Advanced Defense programs (testing, architecture, weapons).
The Second-Lens emphasis on domestic variables includes a focus on government structures. Organizational process and bureaucratic politics models suggest that organizations may view the nation's interest and their own organization's interest as one and the same. The motto on the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's homepage is "Making Ballistic Missile Defense a Reality". The whole purpose of this organization is to pursue missile defense. Thus, a Second-Lens assessment reveals that a powerful governmental organization supported by a powerful industry pressure group (defense contractors) has been able to maintain and expand its budget for seventeen years, despite few technological successes. As a research organization, BMDO has a clear self-interest in removing constraints on testing. So, too, does the defense industry, which would build a full national system. Thus, the government's lead organization on missile defenses has a bias toward ending the ABM Treaty. When policy makers seek advice on developing a policy about missile defense, they go to BMDO. Thus, from a Second-Lens vantage point, it should not be surprising that policy advice is shaded against the ABM Treaty. It would be interesting to consider whether policy would be different if the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the State Department was the designated lead agency on missile defense? BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
Organizational interest is a variable that involves the internal governmental structure of states and is viewed, therefore, through Second-Lens assumptions. The Third Lens suggests a set of assumptions that would support the argument that an external environment might be so threatening that major changes in approaches to international security have to take place. In this case, the Third Lens reveals a focus on the "rogue state threat" as a driving force behind the George W. Bush administration's decision. A Second-Lens analysis would explain how BMDO's organizational mission to develop a missile defense biases its advice in any policy development related to the ABM treaty. BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
The domestic politics of missile defense are interesting. Commentators have suggested that there has been less division on missile defense within Republican Party ranks than on any other issue (for example, there are more pro-choice Republicans than Republicans that do not support missile defense). Why the party has held so firmly and without division on such a complex issue is an interesting separate question to ponder, but the fact is that party unity on this topic has been constant. Democrats have been more divided. Some oppose missile defense on financial grounds; others for arms control reasons. However, some Democrats have been consistent supporters of missile defense. In 1999 the National Missile Defense Act, which committed the United States "to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)," passed with little opposition. Solid Republican congressional support makes the decision to move forward with missile defense by a Republican administration much easier. Which lens helps in understanding why the National Missile Defense Act passed overwhelmingly?
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The Second Lens assumes that domestic politics affect international behavior. Although there are legitimate arguments against missile defense, the politics for missile defense are very favorable. It is difficult for any politician to turn down the option of protecting the United States against attack. Public opinion polls have consistently found that a majority of Americans already think that the United States has deployed a defense against missile attack. The case against missile defense would have to be very strong to convince a majority of politicians to argue against protection that the U.S. public already thinks it receives. But the issues surrounding the technology and cost are complex and uncertain-arguments both for and against its workability at a reasonable cost can be substantiated. There is a majority in Congress in favor of missile defense, and this position is supported by the president. This is a good Second-Lens picture of why the United States is moving forward, despite international concern and objection. Read a defense expert critical of missile defense, and a defense expert in favor of missile defense. BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
Picking up the Third Lens to analyze the George W. Bush decision could lead to a focus on alliances and on the importance of international law. Some scholars dismiss the importance of law and institutions and point to the unilateral call by the United States to abandon the ABM as an indication that power is what matters in international politics. However, when President Bush announced his desire to create missile defenses, he also announced that he was sending delegations to consult with allies and Russia, which reveals that the ABM Treaty is shaping policy behavior. The United States can abrogate the treaty unilaterally, but doing so would have serious implications for many issues beyond missile defense. In announcing its intention to move beyond the ABM treaty, the George W. Bush administration left open several questions: How to get to missile defense (through negotiations and a new agreement perhaps), what the mode of defense would be (the actual type of defense, perhaps joint with the Russians), and when a system would be deployed (the president called for moving beyond the ABM Treaty, but he did not announce that the United States would abrogate the treaty that day). A Third-Lens perspective reveals that the diplomacy of institutions and law may affect U.S. military decisions. For international perspectives on this issue, read the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Missile Defense, 25 July 2000; the Joint Russian-Chinese Statement on ABM Treaty, 14 April 1999; Chinese Ambassador Sha Zukang's position; "The Coming Brawl with Europe over Missile Defense"; and an article on Russian willingness to consult after Bush's speech. BACK TO PREVIOUS QUESTION. BACK TO ORIGINAL QUESTION.
In the summer of 1998, the Congressional Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States released a report that was at odds with existing intelligence estimates. The commission's report indicated that countries the United States considers inclined toward terrorism and risky behaviorrogues such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraqcould produce ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction in the near future. Prior to this report, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) had considered the threat unlikely and asked why any state would launch a missile attack. How to assess and define the external threats facing the United States became the subject of heated internal government debate. Why did the Bush administration accept the more threatening intelligence assessment of the congressional commission over the more moderate view of the intelligence community's NIE?
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