International relations are complex.
There are thousands of factors that may affect
why a particular event occurred. Why did Serbian
and Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic allow NATO bombing to persist for
so long in the spring of 1999 before relenting
to NATO occupation? Why did the People's Republic
of China spy on U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories in
the 1990s? What are the sources
of terrorism? What makes economic trade between
Canada and the United States so important, and
why are there so few conflicts between these
two countries? Should Internet
privacy standards be set by international
treaty? Do individual leaders make a difference?
Or do international politics really spring from
domestic variables? Is conflict inherent or do
factors like trade and technology structure cooperation?
These are questions that go to the heart of international
relations.
The initial difficulty with these
questions is determining where to look for reasonable
explanations. Studying world politics requires
a student to make basic assumptions in order
to find answers to the overwhelming number of
questions. The premise of this webBOOK is that
comprehending complex events requires the construction
of filters. Without such filters, it is difficult
to move beyond mere description to explanation.
How you decide to look at something
ultimately affects the conclusions you draw.
Consider the contrasting effects of a magnifying
glass, binoculars, and a telescope. When you
look out a window with a magnifying glass, certain
things come into focus. Look out that same window,
but with a pair of binoculars, and what comes
into focus is utterly different. Likewise, a
telescope further alters the picture; the picture
has changed because the lens brings a different
element into focus. The same is true of looking
at events through a theoretical lens. Assuming
that certain variables are more important to
study than others will affect what factors you
focus on when studying an event; we will see
those factors and their ramifications more clearly
than all others. In this sense, basic assumptions
shape thinking like different optical lenses
affect visionthey focus attention on a
particular aspect of a broader phenomenon.
In this webBOOK, we call the
use of conceptual lenses to focus our attention
a lenses of analysis framework. This framework
assumes that much of the literature on world
politics relies on three very different types
of causal variables. These three types of variables
suggest very different starting points for studying
international relations and, in a conceptual
sense, function like lenses to narrow and focus
thinking. Each lens reflects a different expectation
about what variables are most important in describing
and explaining world politics.
A case study that this webBOOK
will refer to throughout to explain its theoretical
approachSerbia's choice
to resist NATO's demands at the 1999 Rambouillet
conference and endure seventy-nine days of bombingwill
illustrate the necessity of such assumptions
about international relations. It is difficult
to understand the Serbian decision without employing
an assumption about the basic underpinnings of
international relations. If you were to assume
that individual leaders are more important than
the structure of the international system, you
would understand the Serbian-NATO confrontation
much differently than you would if you believed
that the distribution of power trumps all else.
Should we examine the choices and preferences
of key decision makers within Serbia and NATO?
Or should we analyze NATO's internal politics
and the role of the United
Nations? Naturally, all of these elements
interact, but we must separate out important
parts from the whole in order to assess the nature
and function of those parts. We can then examine
how the parts relate to each other, eventually
developing a better appreciation of the whole.
In short, finding sophisticated explanations
requires us to dissect the problem and examine
each section through the appropriate lens.
Scholars of world politics use
three general lenses to direct their attention
to the key variables that shape the international
issue they are studying and lead them toward
the clusters of variables that influence the
event most profoundly. Some scholars assume that
(1) individuals are key to international relations,
others suggest that (2) states' domestic structures
drive how countries behave internationally, while
yet others contend that (3) the international
system is most important. These basic assumptions
produce very different pictures, and can be thought
of as First-Lens, Second-Lens and Third-Lens
thought processes.
The First Lens
The First Lens assumes that the
preferences and character of individuals explain
world events. First-Lens analysis suggests that
history is altered by leaders' actions. If we
assumed a First-Lens perspective to explain the
Second World War, the thinking, planning, and
decisions of Nazi leader Adolf
Hitler would become the focus of our analysis.
The assumption behind such an analysis is that
history would have taken a different course if
such a man had not led Germany.
Although the assumption that
individual leaders matter seems unassailable,
consider how many individuals in 1939 had to
acquiesce before the war could be fought. The
decision of a few individuals to fight does not
automatically mean that millions of other individuals
will follow. Therefore, to explain a world warthe
goals of which, by definition, require the active
or passive acceptance of millionsmay require
more than a focus on leaders.
The Second Lens
The Second Lens assumes that
domestic political environments ultimately affect
the conduct of world politics. For many political
scientists, the structures in which key individuals
act affect international relations more than
do the individuals themselves. For these thinkers,
the type of government (democratic or authoritarian),
the type of population (multinational or homogeneous),
and the type of economy (free market or state
controlled) lead to specific decisions regardless
of leadership. The Second Lens suggests that
the individual matters much less than does the
political situation.
To illustrate this point, consider
the United States's approach to the Soviet Union,
19451990, a period known as the Cold
War. Although U.S. presidents of this period
hailed from different political parties and had
unique backgrounds, they all followed a relatively
consistent policy of containment.
The Second Lens interprets U.S.Soviet relations
as ideological competition, rather than as a
conflict between individual leaders. Although
there were differences in outlook between Republicans and Democrats,
the grand strategy of the United States remained
consistent when Harry
Truman was replaced by Dwight
Eisenhower in 1952 as well as when Jimmy
Carter handed the White House over to Ronald
Reagan in 1980. The Second Lens, with its
focus on domestic structure, suggests that U.S.
policy remained consistent while leaders changed
because policy reflected U.S. democratic capitalism.
The United States's form of government, economy,
and history structured the relationship with
the communist totalitarian state, which viewed
capitalist democracy as
a competing form of governance. The domestic
structures of these two superpowers determined
their relationship.
Reconsider the question about
the Second World War's origins through the Second
Lens, this time assuming that countries' internal
domestic structures determine world politics.
This assumption shifts the focus from Hitler
to Germany's domestic instability after the First
World War. A weak democratic structure, combined
with a terrible economic depression, increased
political extremism and radicalized the populace.
The internal condition of Germany's economy,
political system, and society may have meant
that conflict with its neighbors was likely regardless
of leadership.
The Third Lens
Some political scientists suggest
that beyond individuals and the domestic fabric
of a state, the structure of the international
system itself affects state relations; this is
the Third Lens. Researchers working from a Third-Lens
perspective note that certain types of governments
might approach international relations similarly
but will not follow the exact same course. For
instance, France and the United States are both
democracies and were allies in two world wars,
yet they disagree on many issues and have pursued,
at times, very different foreign policies. In
addition, the Germany that both France and America
defeated in both world wars is now a military
ally in NATO. The German people have not discarded
their culture or their sense of the German nation,
yet America, France, and Germany have related
very differently to each other during the last
fifty years of the twentieth century than they
did during the first half of the century.
The Third Lens assumes that just
as the state shapes individual leaders, so too
does the overall international system affect
collections of individuals (states). The dynamics
of a bipolar international system, one dominated
by two superpowers, might differ from the workings
of unipolar or multipolar systems, each of which
is based on a different distribution of power.
The Third Lens assumes that the distribution
of power among states affects democractic and
authoritarian governments similarly. The way
in which U.S. president George
W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir
Putin guide their two countries at the start
of the twenty-first century is determined less
by their personal interests or state structures
than by the power of the United States relative
to Russia.
The Third-Lens perspective also
considers international institutions, such as
the United Nations or NATO, and international
legal standards. In short, the Third Lens focuses
our view of international relations on the interaction
between institutions and law on the world stage
and on the relative power of states.
Examined through the Third Lens,
responsibility for the Second World War shifts
from a focus on Hitler (First Lens) and German
domestic instability (Second Lens) to the map
of Europe. Germany did
not exist before 1871. A few short years later,
though, an emergent Germany controlled large
portions of central Europe. The Third Lens explains
Germany's pivotal role in the two world wars
by the fact that it emerged in the middle of
a politically settled region. Its arrival on
the map upset the distribution of power and sparked
conflict that lasted well into the twentieth
century. From this perspective, it was not a
fanatical leader or domestic instability that
brought about war, but rather a dramatic change
in political geography and power relations that
was not contained by law or the international
institutions of the time.
Lenses versus Levels
In the late 1950s, Professor
Kenneth Waltz wrote the seminal work Man,
the State, and War, which comprehensively
reviewed the study of international conflict.
He asked what causes war and found that most
of those who contemplated this question started
from one of three general assumptions: The causal
variable was either individuals, domestic structures,
or the international system itself. Waltz noted: "Staring
at the same set of data, the parties to the debate
came to sharply different conclusions, for the
images they entertained led them to select and
interpret data in different ways"(Waltz, Man,
the State, and War, p. 10). Waltz suggests
that, "the idea we entertain becomes a filter
through which we pass our data" (p. 10).
His book explained why so many competing explanations
of war exist by showing that different basic
assumptions produce different answers.
Recognizing how assumptions about
world politics shape viewpoints is not merely
interesting academically, but rather is profoundly
important in the world of policy as well. Waltz
pointed out that the "practice of politics
is greatly influenced by the images the politicians
entertain" (p. 225). He noted, for example,
that President Woodrow
Wilson's conviction that democracies would
prefer to avoid war led to his promotion of democracy
as a policy for world peace. Although "making
the world safe for democracy" meant waging
war against nondemocratic states, Wilson assumed
that creating democracies would extend the zone
of peace. Wilson viewed the world through the
Second Lens, he assumed that the domestic structure
of states mattered most, and this colored his
view of both individual leaders and the balance
of power.
Political scientist J. David
Singer broadened Waltz's examination by suggesting
that these different conclusions about the causes
of war stemmed from analytical distinctions that
could facilitate the study of international relations
in general. Singer suggested that Waltz had discovered
different levels at which world politics could
be analyzed. In most textbooks today, therefore,
Kenneth Waltz's name is associated with the phrase "levels
of analysis," despite the fact that he did
not emphasize this phrase in Man, the State,
and War.
The lenses of analysis framework
presented in this webBOOK reflects the same analytical
distinctions discussed in other books using the
phrase "levels of analysis." The notion
of a lens, however, better reflects the thought
processes used in studying world politics analytically.
As Waltz suggested, our perspective on important
variables filters the study of international
relations. Our basic assumptions provide a powerful
lens that determines what variables we choose
to examine closely, what descriptions we develop,
what arguments we present, and what conclusions
we draw.
Building a Mosaic?
It is important to consider whether
the best explanation of international events
integrates the separate pictures produced by
the three lenses into a larger mosaic. Once we
have simplified the complexity of international
politics by taking snapshots with each lens to
narrow our focus on an issue, should we integrate
all of the pictures into one multifaceted whole
to achieve a fuller understanding? The answer
is: Not necessarily.
An important distinction exists
between description and explanation. A description
of an international event will be richer when
all of the images produced through the three
lenses are considered together. However, taking
partial views of a complex scene may be sufficient
to support solid explanation. Indeed, the key
causal variables in a particular case may be
found through one lens. The addition of other
lenses may provide more information but may not
improve our understanding of the core reason
why an event occurred or why an aspect of world
politics follows a certain pattern.
It is also important to recognize
that the assumptions behind each lens are not
necessarily compatible. Consider the earlier
example of Woodrow Wilson. He concluded that
a focus on relative power and the need to balance
had led to the First World War. Wilson believed,
however, that democracies, which gave voice to
the people and emphasized respect for individuals,
could avoid the dangers of the balancing dynamic.
This Wilsonian logic was applied seventy years
later to the decision to expand NATO membership.
NATO's official statement
on expansion maintains:
that NATO's expansion will accord with "the
safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage,
and civilization of all Alliance members and
their people, founded on the principles of
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule
of law . . . [and will lead to a] security
architecture that transcends and renders obsolete
the idea of dividing lines in Europe.
The expectation of NATO members
is that the expansion of democracyinstitutionally
supported by linking NATO membership with democratic
structures, such as free elections, representative
legislatures, and civilian control over militarieswould
create a zone of peace in Europe. The focus is
not on how relative power divides states but
on how common governments bind states. The notion
of eliminating dividing lines borrows directly
from a Wilsonian rejection of balance-of-power
politics.
On the other hand, Otto von Bismarck,
Germany's famous nineteenth-century chancellor,
viewed the balance of power as the key to international
politics. At its core, his foreign policy goal
was to maintain an equilibrium, so that Germany
would never have to face both France and Russia
in war at the same time. Bismarck derived his
image of world politics from the Third Lenshe
thought that the distribution of power in Europe
was the determining factor in European state
behavior. A Bismarckian view might contend that
the First World War was caused by poor management
of the balancing dynamic and not by the balance
of power itself.
In a sense, Wilson and Bismarck's
views are not reconcilable. If one assumes that
all great powers are concerned with balancing
and shifting alliances, then whether they are
democracies or not does not matter. Either balancing
is inherent in international relations, or it
can be overcome by democratic governance.
Thus, building an integrated
mosaic may not be possible. While acknowledging
that combining all three lenses can produce a
broader description of all the key variables
related to an issue, the prescriptions (that
is, the policy choices) that derive from each
perspective may not be easily blended together.
If it is correct that democracies do not go to
war with other democracies, then spreading democratic
ideologies will decrease the possibility of war
within a given region. Thus, NATO's expansion
in the 1990s should support stability in Europe.
If, however, it is the balance of power among
nations and not the domestic structure of those
nations that leads to peace, then NATO expansion
will increase tensions. From a balance-of-power
perspective, NATO expansion should lead to the
formation of balancing coalitionsRussia
and China, for exampleeven if Russia were
to become a democratic state. Therefore, if U.S.
and Russian leaders hold different assumptions
about international relations, their policy decisions
concerning NATO may come into conflict.
Rather than thinking about building
a mosaic, consider comparing the different pictures
produced by the lenses. Through this process
of comparison, we can determine whether the picture
produced through one lens is more compelling
than that produced through another. On its own,
a First-Lens focus on Slobodan Milosevic may
produce an interesting explanation of Serbia's
actions versus NATO in 1999. But whether that
explanation is the best cannot be determined
unless alternative arguments are examined. The
conclusions produced by the other lenses must
be considered when assessing the strength of
any given argument.
In summary, examining a case
through all three lenses may enhance description
but will not always lead to the best prescription.
Instead, picking up each lens in turn and comparing
the findings that result will produce the best
answers.
A word of caution, however: Beginning
with one particular lens can distort the images
that emerge through the other lenses. J. David
Singer imparted some good advice on this score,
when he wrote that "there is a natural tendency
to endow that upon which we focus our attention
with somewhat greater potential than it might
normally be expected to have" ("The
Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," p.
80). Start with a balanced view, but recognize
that in the end, one lens might actually prove
more useful than another in producing a persuasive
argument.
The Framework section is divided
into three parts. Each part begins with a basic
assumptionone of the three lensesabout
international relations' important variables.
You can click on the core variables related to
each lens to read about how those variables affect
a picture of the world.
FIRST
LENS
SECOND
LENS
THIRD
LENS
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