Welcome to the demo Lenses of Analysis. This demo is designed to give students and instructors a perspective on how Lenses of Analysis is structured. This demo is organized around the question of why the Persian Gulf War of 1991 began. Students can read about the historical background of the conflict, look at one variable through the First Lens (the decision making of President Saddam Hussein), and process one question string. Note that in a full analysis, multiple variables are examined through the First, Second, and Third Lenses. This illustration shows what a focus on one variable both can and cannot reveal; it also provides a representative historical background section, and an example of the hyperlink interactive support found in the main section the webbook. In the full case analyses found in main section, students get a complete introduction to the Lenses framework in Chapter 1, and then all three lenses are applied to the Kosovo and NAFTA cases.
The Persian Gulf War of 1991 (chronology) was an important and complex event. It was not only an example of the United Nations collective security mission at its best, but was also a symbol of the emergence of the United States as the world's only superpower. It elevated the principles of international law, while supporting the straightforward national interests of great powers. It was a limited war that had profound effects on regional politics. It was a quick battlefield victory that, politically at least, remained unresolved a decade after its supposed conclusion. Those that led the winning coalition were out of power within a few years, while Iraqi President Saddam Hussein remained the leader of his country. It was an exercise of astute crisis and coercive diplomacy, and yet no diplomatic solution could be found. Despite great international support, the American administration of President George H. Bush pushed for the offensive military option over other strategies, and despite wide international opposition, Iraq decided not to back down.
War is never inevitable. It follows from specific decisions and distinct actions in the context of particular institutions and structures of power. The leaders of the two main protagonists in this case—the United States and Iraq-—knew where they were heading. The fact that war broke out came as no surprise. A week before the war began the two principal foreign policy advisors, Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, met in Geneva to see if conflict could be avoided. This tense encounter proved only to make war more likely.
Was the war a conflict of the wills of George Bush and Saddam Hussein? Was the war a dispute over the control of oil? Was it the result of the emerging unipolar distribution of power? Each one of these conjectures implies a different focus and a different generalizable assumption about what causes international events like war. Underlying the first question is the assumption that war is caused by the thinking and actions of a few individuals. The second question implies that the natural resources and the economic stability of a country might create the conditions for war (in this case, economic dependency on oil). The third implies that the absence of an effective counterbalance to American hegemony might have led to power projection in the Gulf. It is critical to recognize that these observations not only allow for different conclusions about what caused the Persian Gulf War of 1991, but also focus on completely different variables.
One way to sift through the complexity of this case is to organize our study around clusters of variables that fall under a basic assumption about what drives international relations. In separating these variables out, we can more carefully study them in isolation. This will provide us a better grasp of the complexity of the war as we add other variables associated with other assumptions to our overall understanding. While both presidents, for example, may be interesting personalities and their decision making quite intriguing, would any leader have reacted the same way to the same conditions? If so, then President Hussein and President Bush might not, as causal variables, be that revealing as explanations of the war. If the answer is no, then perhaps the war can be explained primarily as resulting from the actions of a few people.
For the purposes of this illustration, let's assume that individual decision makers do make a difference and let's click through a First Lens focus on one particular leader: President Saddam Hussein. Of course, a more complete analysis would also require a First Lens examination of President Bush; a Second Lens focus on the domestic structures—type of government, type of economy, natural resources, population, internal politics—that might have created conditions for war; and a Third Lens analysis of the distribution of power and regional balancing, as well as international law and the United Nations.
Click here first if you need some historical background on the war before beginning your analysis, then take a look at President Hussein's decision-making through your First Lens.