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Lenses of Analysis is a webbook that offers
a conceptual framework for understanding international relations.
It is premised on the notion that certain simplifying assumptions
can make the complexity of world politics more manageable, and thus
the study of it more rewarding.
There is a difference between a casual observer
of world politics and a student of international relations. We should
expect general commentary and opinion from the former. From the
latter, however, we expect accurate description, supported explanation,
and perhaps even generalized prescriptions and predictions. To move
from assertion to persuasive argument, we need to examine our subject
in a systematic way; that is, we need to decide what to examine
and then develop an understanding of how the various elements of
what we are analyzing connect to each other and relate to some broader
concept. This webbook suggests that the most significant first step
to studying international relations is the choice of the basic assumption
one makes about what actually drives world politics. This basic
assumption has a powerful effect, because it determines which variables
and factors will receive the most attention and study. This choice
of focus, in turn, affects the specific explanations of international
events as well as the conclusions one reaches about international
relations in general.
World politics during the latter half of the twentieth
century was dominated by two superpowers—the United States
and the Soviet Union. As the competition between these two countries
came to an end in the early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet
empire, there was a flurry of analysis and editorials suggesting
that international relations had suddenly become more complex. Attention
focused on ethnic conflict and a seeming reemergence of virulent
nationalism.
Civil wars combined with disputes over borders to provide a picture
of a new trend toward fragmentation. Concurrently, technological
advances seemed to be spurring economic activity to greater degrees
of integration at a global level. By the late 1990s, ethnic
cleansing and globalization
were common terms in the lexicon of world affairs.
It is reasonable to assume new activity is the manifestation
of unique phenomena and to conclude that much of what was being
labeled “revolutionary” did represent a measurable discontinuity
with past phenomena. But there is another possibility. International
relations may not be any more complex with the end of the cold war
and the emergence of the Internet than they were before. It is possible
that international relations have always been highly complex, but
what changed toward the end of the millennium was that it became
more difficult to understand that complexity. The cold war not only
defined the interaction between states, but it represented a powerful
conceptual filter through which political scientists and others
studied those interactions. The prism of competition between East
versus West, communism versus democratic capitalism, led to different
labels and different analyses. What now is viewed as ethnic conflict
may have been (mis?)labeled ideological conflict. Technological
advance may have been viewed primarily through a military-security
perspective, rather than an economic-profit model. (Remember the
network of computers that led to the Internet was originally designed
as a nonhierarchical communication system to guard against a surprise
massive Soviet nuclear attack.)
The basic assumptions we make about what drives
international relations actually structure our study of international
relations. In the autumn of 2000, the leader of Serbia fell out
of power. Was this the triumph of democracy? The result of NATO
military intervention? Economic sanctions and the funding of opposition
groups? Or was it poor decision making on the part of Slobodan Milosevic?
Answering this question is not simply important for historical curiosity,
but it may have a direct impact on future international relations.
If the case can be made that regime change required military intervention,
the possibility of such intervention in the future in other parts
of the world might increase. But what if military intervention was
not required, but just believed to be the key causal variable in
bringing down the dictatorship of Milosevic? Could this inaccurate
read of history lead to ineffective and inappropriate uses of force
in the future? It would not be the first time that the so-called
lessons of history have been misapplied. The academic perspective
of political science requires the student to move beyond just accurate
description of events and to search for a persuasive explanation
for these occurrences. But the nature of the subject matter is quite
practical. These explanations of international relations can affect
policy and thus affect people's lives in dramatic ways.
The premise of this webbook is the idea that one
must make simplifying assumptions about world politics in order
to gain an understanding of the enormous complexity of international
relations. Without these basic assumptions, it is difficult to move
beyond mere description and answer why something happens. How you
decide to look at something ultimately affects the conclusions you
draw. Just as the image of something changes if you look through
a microscope or through a pair of binoculars, so too does analysis
change when you assume certain clusters of causal variables are
more important than others. If you look out a window with a pair
of binoculars, certain things will come clearly into your view.
Look out that same window, but this time with a magnifying glass,
and although you are looking at the same general area, what becomes
clear to you is utterly different; the picture has changed. The
same effect is true of theoretical assumptions. If we assume that
certain variables are more important to study than others, that
determination will affect what factors we focus on when studying
an event; we will see those factors more clearly than all others.
That is what the three hyperlink lenses denote. They are simply
representations of our conceptual biases, which, when dealing with
complex subjects, are invariably relied upon.
If you assume that individual leaders are more important
than the governance structure of states, you will understand the
origins of the Second World War much differently than someone who
assumes the distribution of power trumps all else. (The former analysis
concludes that war does not occur without Adolf Hitler in power;
the latter, that conflict would have been likely in Europe even
if Hitler himself did not rise to control Germany.) When you filter
information through your own conceptual lens to study the origins
of the Second World War, what comes into view?
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