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The Persian Gulf War of 1991 (chronology)
was an important and complex event. It was not only an example of
the United Nations collective
security mission at its best, but was also a symbol of the emergence
of the United States as the world's only superpower. It elevated
the principles of international
law, while supporting the straightforward national interests
of great powers. It was a limited
war that had profound effects on regional politics. It was a
quick battlefield victory that, politically at least, remained unresolved
a decade after its supposed conclusion. Those that led the winning
coalition were out of power within a few years, while Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein remained the leader of his country. It was an
exercise of astute crisis and coercive
diplomacy, and yet no diplomatic solution could be found. Despite
great international support, the American administration of President
George H. Bush pushed for the offensive military option over
other strategies, and despite wide international opposition, Iraq
decided not to back down.
War is never inevitable. It follows from specific
decisions and distinct actions in the context of particular institutions
and structures of power. The leaders of the two main protagonists
in this case—the United States and Iraq-—knew where they
were heading. The fact that war broke out came as no surprise. A
week before the war began the two principal foreign policy advisors,
Secretary of
State James Baker and Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz, met in Geneva to see if conflict could
be avoided. This tense
encounter proved only to make war more likely.
Was the war a conflict of the wills of George Bush
and Saddam Hussein? Was the war a dispute over the control of oil?
Was it the result of the emerging unipolar distribution of power?
Each one of these conjectures implies a different focus and a different
generalizable assumption about what causes international events
like war. Underlying the first question is the assumption that war
is caused by the thinking and actions of a few individuals. The
second question implies that the natural resources and the economic
stability of a country might create the conditions for war (in this
case, economic dependency on oil). The third implies that the absence
of an effective counterbalance to American hegemony might have led
to power projection in the Gulf. It is critical to recognize that
these observations not only allow for different conclusions about
what caused the Persian Gulf War of 1991, but also focus on completely
different variables.
One way to sift through the complexity of this case
is to organize our study around clusters of variables that fall
under a basic assumption about what drives international relations.
In separating these variables out, we can more carefully study them
in isolation. This will provide us a better grasp of the complexity
of the war as we add other variables associated with other assumptions
to our overall understanding. While both presidents, for example,
may be interesting personalities and their decision making quite
intriguing, would any leader have reacted the same way to the same
conditions? If so, then President Hussein and President Bush might
not, as causal variables, be that revealing as explanations of the
war. If the answer is no, then perhaps the war can be explained
primarily as resulting from the actions of a few people.
For the purposes of this illustration, let's assume
that individual decision makers do make a difference and let's click
through a First Lens focus on one particular leader: President Saddam
Hussein. Of course, a more complete analysis would also require
a First Lens examination of President Bush; a Second Lens focus
on the domestic structures—type of government, type of economy,
natural resources, population, internal politics—that might
have created conditions for war; and a Third Lens analysis of the
distribution of power and regional balancing, as well as international
law and the United Nations.
Click here first if you need some historical
background on the war before beginning your analysis, then take
a look at President Hussein's decision-making through your First
Lens.
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