The Fair Deal and Containment - Document Overview
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On April 12, 1945, an inexperienced Harry Truman became president and immediately confronted issues of bewildering magnitude and complexity. The protracted world war had altered the balance of power in Europe, dislodged colonial empires, and created social and political turbulence within nations. Of immediate concern was the disintegration of the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union. Having "liberated" eastern Europe from Nazi control, the Soviets were imposing their own political and military will upon the region, determined to absorb the area into their own sphere of influence. While the United States insisted that the peoples of eastern Europe should determine their own postwar status through democratic elections and free trade, the Soviets were even more determined to create a buffer of "friendly states" along their western border so as to prevent another invasion of their homeland (Russia had been invaded three times since the early nineteenth century).
Throughout 1946 and 1947 political leaders subservient to Soviet desires consolidated their control over eastern Europe, especially Poland. At the same time, the Soviets established a puppet regime in newly created East Germany. Former British prime minister Winston Churchill warned that Stalin had pulled an "iron curtain" of repression across the eastern half of Europe that threatened the security of the western democracies.
In the process of pursuing such conflicting objectives in eastern Europe, both sides helped escalate tensions and intensify an emerging "cold war" (a phrase popularized by the prominent American journalist Walter Lippmann). By 1947 American officials had become convinced that Soviet foreign policy was not pursuing legitimate security concerns; instead, they had come to view Stalin as a paranoid dictator driven by an uncompromising communist ideology that envisioned world domination.
In early 1947 Truman's key foreign policy aides—Secretary of State and former army chief of staff George C. Marshall, Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson, and career foreign service officer George F. Kennan—fashioned a new diplomatic strategy to deal with the burgeoning Cold War. Truman was tired of "babying the Russians" and wanted a tougher stance. The lesson that he and others had drawn from the failed statesmanship of the 1930s was that appeasing aggressive dictators was disastrous. His advisors responded with what became known as the "containment policy."
The first application of this containment doctrine focused on the eastern Mediterranean. Since 1946 the Greek government had been locked in a civil war with Communist guerrillas. At the same time, its neighbor Turkey was facing unrelenting pressure from the Soviet Union to gain naval access to the Mediterranean. The British had provided financial and military support to the Greeks and Turks, but in early 1947 they informed the United States that they could no longer provide such assistance because of their own economic distress.
Truman acted swiftly. On March 12, 1947, he asked a joint session of Congress to provide $400 million worth of military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey. He portrayed the situation in stark terms: failure to act would encourage further Soviet expansion around the world. In stating the case for such assistance, the president outlined what became known as the Truman Doctrine. The United States, he said, must be willing to support free peoples everywhere in order to resist the cancer of "totalitarian regimes." Failure to so would "endanger the peace of the world" and the "welfare of our own nation."
The Truman Doctrine laid the foundation for American foreign policy during the next forty years. It committed the United States to the role of a world-wide policeman. Critics, including George Kennan, warned that the United States could not alone suppress every Communist insurgency around the world. The prominent journalist Walter Lippmann derided the new containment doctrine as a "strategic monstrosity" that would entangle the United States in endless international disputes. It was a fateful prediction.
Truman's policies could not keep pace with the dynamic changes reshaping the world order. In 1949 the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong won a civil war against the "nationalist" forces of Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and forced the nationalists off the mainland onto the island of Formosa (Taiwan). Dean Acheson, who became secretary of state in 1949, quickly asserted that "the Communist regime serves not [Chinese] interests but those of Soviet Russia." The victory of Mao's forces prompted Truman's critics to ask "Who lost China?" Republicans believed that the United States should have acted more aggressively to support Jiang's nationalist cause.
Truman faced new problems as well. The discovery that the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, years in advance of American predictions, gave Republicans another weapon in their fight with the administration. The Soviets, they reasoned, must have gained access to secret American documents through their espionage network in the United States. Scattered evidence of successful Soviet espionage in North America gave fuel to the partisan claim that the Truman administration was "soft on Communism" and helped launch the anticommunist crusade led by Republican senator Joseph McCarthy.
The invasion of South Korea in June 1950 by 75,000 Soviet-equipped North Korean troops surprised the world and heightened fears of possible Communist infiltration at home. McCarthy stepped up his campaign of accusations and half-truths sprinkled with obscenities. Truman first pushed through the United Nations a resolution of condemnation. He then ordered General Douglas MacArthur to send military equipment to the South Koreans and to use American airpower to blunt the North Korean advance. Truman never asked Congress for a declaration of war. Officially, the Korean conflict was a police action supported by the United Nations. Critics labeled it "Mr. Truman's War."
In September General MacArthur assumed the offensive with a brilliant maneuver that outflanked the North Koreans and sent them reeling. Sensing a great victory, MacArthur and Truman convinced the United Nations to allow the allied forces to cross the thirty-eighth parallel, "liberate" North Korea from Communist control, and unify the country under democratic rule. A policy of containment now gave way to a policy of liberation. The plan was working to perfection by mid-October as the American-dominated U.N. forces pushed across North Korea toward the Yalu River border with China. Concerned about Chinese entry into the conflict, Truman flew to Midway Island to consult with MacArthur. The American general dismissed concerns about the Chinese, arguing that they could not mount significant opposition and that American air-power would neutralize them in any event. Truman remained skeptical and ordered MacArthur to use only South Korean forces in the vanguard of the coalition as it approached the border.
But MacArthur refused to be bridled by his civilian commander-in-chief. He disobeyed the president, and moved American and British troops close to the Yalu River on November 24. Two days later 300,000 Chinese "volunteers" came streaming across the border, attacking in waves inspired by blaring bugles. The U.N. forces fell back in the most brutal fighting of the war. Three weeks later they recrossed the thirty-eighth parallel. In the midst of the retreat, MacArthu asked permission to bomb bridges on the Yalu River as well as Chinese bases across the border. He also asked for a naval blockade of the Chinese coast and suggested the possible use of Nationalist Chinese forces in Korea.
Truman feared that such measures would provoke World War III with China and possibly the Soviet Union. His assessment of the situation was bleak: the best that could be achieved was a negotiated restoration of the dividing line at the thirty-eighth parallel. To MacArthur this smacked of appeasement, and he publicly criticized Truman, saying that "there is no substitute for victory." Truman now had no choice but to relieve the popular but erratic and insubordinate MacArthur. The cashiered general returned to a hero's welcome in the United States, including a ticker-tape parade down New York City's Fifth Avenue. His Republican supporters called for Truman's impeachment and urged MacArthur to run for president. But the Congressional testimony of General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, blunted MacArthur's case. Expanding the fighting into China, Bradley asserted, would be "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."
As the months passed and the war ground on, public opinion soured on Truman and the American commitment in Korea. By the onset of the 1952 election campaign, the battlefront in Korea had stabilized at the thirty-eighth parallel and voters simply wanted the conflict ended. Negotiations begun in July 1951 dragged on for two years while intense but sporadic fighting continued. When an armistice agreement was finally concluded by the Eisenhower administration in 1953, the Korean conflict had cost over $20 billion and 33,000 American lives. Over 2 million Koreans had been killed. Communism had been contained but at a high cost.
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The Sources of Soviet Conduct (1947), George F. Kennan
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George F. Kennan was a career diplomat with extensive service abroad as well as in Washington. In 1947 he had been tapped to head the State Department's new policy planning staff, which was to provide long-range analyses and plans for the conduct of American foreign relations. This article was a distillation of a long cable message that Kennan had prepared a year before while serving in the American embassy in Moscow. Published in the July 1947 issue of the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "Mr. X," it offered an unofficial summary of administration assessments of the Soviet threat. As he himself later admitted, Kennan failed to specify what he meant by containment—economic? political? military? Kennan's vague language also implied a global commitment to contain Communism militarily anywhere and everywhere in the world. Policymakers in later years would fail to distinguish between areas vital to American interests and regions of less significance.
The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. . . . The main concern [of the Kremlin] 1 is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, increasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that the goal must be reached at any given time.
These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power.
On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries—policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.
In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." . . . The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is the sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.
In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. . . .
It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.
Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. . . .
It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. . . .
1. Editorial insertion.
[Reprinted by permission of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 566-82. Copyright 1947 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.]
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A Critique of Containment (1947), Walter Lippmann
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Kennan's "containment doctrine" elicited a spirited critique from Walter Lippmann, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist widely recognized as one of the most authoritative commentators on political and diplomatic affairs.
. . . My objection, then, to the policy of containment is not that it seeks to confront the Soviet power with American power, but that the policy is misconceived, and must result in a misuse of American power. For as I have sought to show, it commits this country to a struggle which has for its objective nothing more substantial than the hope that in ten or fifteen years the Soviet power will, as the result of long frustration, "break up" or "mellow." In this prolonged struggle the role of the United States is, according to Mr. X, to react "at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points" to the encroachments of the Soviet power.
The policy, therefore, concedes to the Kremlin the strategic initiative as to when, where and under what local circumstances the issue is to be joined. It compels the United States to meet the Soviet pressure at these shifting geographical and political points by using satellite states, puppet governments and agents which have been subsidized and supported, though their effectiveness is meager and their reliability uncertain. By forcing us to expend our energies and our substance upon these dubious and unnatural allies on the perimeter of the Soviet Union, the effect of the policy is to neglect our natural allies in the Atlantic community, and to alienate them.
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All the other pressures of the Soviet Union at the "constantly shifting geographical and political points," which Mr. X is so concerned about—in the Middle East and in Asia—are, I contend, secondary and subsidiary to the fact that its armed forces are in the heart of Europe. It is to the Red Army in Europe, therefore, and not to ideologies, elections, forms of government, to socialism, to communism, to free enterprise, that a correctly conceived and soundly planned policy should be directed. . . .
We may now consider how we are to relate our role in the United Nations to our policy in the conflict with Russia. Mr. X does not deal with this question. But the State Department, in its attempt to operate under the Truman Doctrine, has shown where that doctrine would take us. It would take us to the destruction of the U.N. . . .
The U.N., which should be preserved as the last best hope of mankind that the conflict can be settled and a peace achieved, is being chewed up. The seed corn is being devoured. Why? Because the policy of containment, as Mr. X has exposed it to the world, does not have as its objective a settlement of the conflict with Russia. It is therefore implicit in the policy that the U.N. has no future as a universal society, and that either the U.N. will be cast aside like the League of Nations, or it will be transformed into an anti-Soviet coalition. In either event the U.N. will have been destroyed. . . .
[From Walter Lippmann,
The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945 (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley Co., 1973), pp. 47, 49-51.]
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The Truman Doctrine (1947)
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Although the catalyst for this speech was the crisis in Greece and Turkey, Truman and his advisors seized the opportunity to delineate their broader concept of the postwar world and America's obligations. By pledging to resist Communism anywhere and everywhere, Truman established a dangerous precedent.
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government. The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. . . . Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority to the Government throughout Greek territory.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply this assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek Government.
The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.
We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required. . . .
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.
Since the war Turkey has sought additional financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting the modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential the preservation of order in the Middle East.
The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.
I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.
To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of the minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the charter of the United Nations.
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the west as well as to the east. We must take immediate and resolute action.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948.
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized. . . .
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.
Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.
[From
Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 March 1947, p. 1981.]
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The Marshall Plan (1947)
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Secretary of State George C. Marshall knew that the political stability of western Europe depended on its economic health. In this address to the Harvard graduating class of 1947, he outlined the rationale for a massive infusion of American aid into the postwar recovery in Europe. He did not yet know the details of administering such a program, but he was confident of its necessity.
I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisal of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the longsuffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy.
For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. . . . Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization.
Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next 3 or 4 years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.
Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.
Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.
It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government.
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.
An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.
[From
Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 19 December 1947, pp. 11,749-51.]
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