No man who knows aught, can be so stupid
to deny that all men naturally were born
free, being the image and resemblance of
God himself,
>> note 1 and
were, by privilege above all the creatures,
born to command, and not to obey; and that
they lived so, till from the root of Adam's
transgression falling among themselves
to do wrong and violence, and foreseeing
that such courses must needs tend to the
destruction of them all, they agreed by
common league to bind each other from mutual
injury, and jointly to defend themselves
against any that gave disturbance or opposition
to such agreement. Hence came cities, towns,
and commonwealths. And because no faith
in all was found sufficiently binding,
they found it needful to ordain some authority
that might restrain by force and punishment
what was violated against peace and common
right.
This authority and power of self-defense
and preservation being originally and naturally
in every one of them, and unitedly in them
all, for ease, for order, and lest each man
should be his own partial judge, they communicated
and derived either to one whom for the eminence
of his wisdom and integrity they chose above
the rest, or to more than one whom they thought
of equal deserving. The first was called
a king,
>> note 2 the
other, magistrates: not to be their lords
and masters (though afterward those names
in some places were given voluntarily to
such as had been authors of inestimable
good to the people), but to be their deputies
and commissioners, to execute, by virtue
of their entrusted power, that justice
which else every man by the bond of nature
and of covenant must have executed for
himself, and for one another. And to him
that shall consider well why among free
persons one man by civil right should bear
authority and jurisdiction over another,
no other end or reason can be imaginable.
These for a while governed well and with
much equity decided all things at their own
arbitrement, till the temptation of such
a power, left absolute in their hands, perverted
them at length to injustice and partiality.
Then did they who now by trial had found
the danger and inconveniences of committing
arbitrary power to any, invent laws, either
framed or consented to by all, that should
confine and limit the authority of whom they
chose to govern them: that so man, of whose
failing they had proof, might no more rule
over them, but law and reason, abstracted
as much as might be from personal errors
and frailties: while, as the magistrate was
set above the people, so the law was set
above the magistrate.
>> note 3 When
this would not serve, but that the law
was either not executed, or misapplied,
they were constrained from that time, the
only remedy left them, to put conditions
and take oaths from all kings and magistrates
at their first installment to do impartial
justice by law: who, upon those terms and
no other, received allegiance from the
people, that is to say, bond or covenant
to obey them in execution of those laws
which they, the people, had themselves
made or assented to. And this ofttimes
with express warning, that if the king
or magistrate proved unfaithful to his
trust, the people would be disengaged.
They added also counselors and parliaments,
not to be only at his beck, but, with him
or without him, at set times, or at all times
when any danger threatened, to have care
of the public safety. Therefore saith Claudius
Sesell,
>> note 4 a
French statesman, "The parliament
was set as a bridle to the king";
which I instance rather, not because our
English lawyers have not said the same
long before, but because that French monarchy
is granted by all to be a far more absolute
than ours. That this and the rest of what
has hitherto been spoken is most true,
might be copiously made appear throughout
all stories, heathen and Christian; even
of those nations where kings and emperors
have sought means to abolish all ancient
memory of the people's right by their
encroachments and usurpations. But I spare
long insertions, appealing to the known
constitutions of both the latest Christian
empires in Europe, the Greek and the German,
besides the French, Italian, Arragonian,
English, and not least the Scottish histories:
not forgetting this only by the way, that
William the Norman, though a conqueror,
and not unsworn at his coronation, was
compelled the second time to take oath
>> note 5 at
St. Albans' ere the people would be brought to yield obedience.
It being thus manifest that the power of
kings and magistrates is nothing else but
what is only derivative, transferred, and
committed to them in trust from the people
to the common good of them all, in whom the
power yet remains fundamentally and cannot
be taken from them without a violation of
their natural birthright, and seeing that
from hence Aristotle, and the best of political
writers, have defined a king, him who governs
to the good and profit of his people, and
not for his own ends
>> note 6 — it
follows from necessary causes that the
titles of sovereign lord, natural lord,
and the like, are either arrogancies or
flatteries, not admitted by emperors and
kings of best note, and disliked by the
church both of Jews (Isaiah 26:13)
>> note 7 and
ancient Christians, as appears by Tertullian
and others. Although generally the people
of Asia, and with them the Jews also, especially
since the time they chose a king against
the advice and counsel of God, are noted
by wise authors
>> note 8 much
inclinable to slavery.
Secondly, that to say, as is usual, the
king hath as good right to his crown and
dignity as any man hath to his inheritance,
is to make the subject no better than the
king's slave, his chattel, or his possession
that may be bought and sold. And doubtless,
if hereditary title were sufficiently inquired,
the best foundation of it would be found
but in courtesy or convenience. But suppose
it to be of right hereditary, what can be
more just and legal, if a subject for certain
crimes be to forfeit by law from himself
and posterity all his inheritance to the
king, than that a king, for crimes proportional,
should forfeit all his title and inheritance
to the people? Unless the people must be
thought created all for him, he not for them,
and they all in one body inferior to him
single; which were a kind of treason against
the dignity of mankind to affirm.
It follows, lastly, that since the king
or magistrate holds his authority of the
people, both originally and naturally for
their good in the first place, and not his
own, then may the people, as oft as they
shall judge it for the best, either choose
him or reject him, retain him or depose him,
though no tyrant, merely by the liberty and
right of freeborn men to be governed as seems
to them best. This, though it cannot but
stand with plain reason, shall be made good
also by scripture.
For as to this question in hand, what the
people by their just right may do in change
of government or of governor, we see it cleared
sufficiently, besides other ample authority,
even from the mouths of princes themselves.
And surely they that shall boast, as we do,
to be a free nation, and not have in themselves
the power to remove or abolish any governor
supreme or subordinate, with the government
itself upon urgent causes, may please their
fancy with a ridiculous and painted freedom
fit to cozen babies; but are indeed under
tyranny and servitude, as wanting that power
which is the root and source of all liberty,
to dispose and economize
>> note 9 in
the land which God hath given them, as
masters of family in their own house and
free inheritance. Without which natural
and essential power of a free nation, though
bearing high their heads, they can in due
esteem be thought no better than slaves
and vassals born, in the tenure and occupation
of another inheriting lord, whose government,
though not illegal or intolerable, hangs
over them as a lordly scourge, not as a
free government — and therefore to
be abrogated.
How much more justly then may they fling
off tyranny or tyrants, who being once deposed
can be no more than private men, as subject
to the reach of justice and arraignment as
any other transgressors?