1. Letter by Aihara Yu in Asahi Shimbun, August 14, 1994. Technically, this was not the first time the emperor's voice had been carried over the airwaves. In December 1928, a small scandal ensued when broadcasters covering a military review inadvertently picked up and transmitted his words as he read a rescript to the assembled troops; Asahi Shimbun, May 16, 1995. 2. As a general rule, confidential Japanese accounts of the emperor's activities must be treated with great caution in that they rely on notations and recollections by close aides devoted to burnishing his image. The earliest official account of high-level activities leading up to the emperor's broadcast was conveyed to U.S. occupation authorities in November 1945 by Sakomizu Hisatsune, chief secretary to the cabinet at the time of surrender and personally involved in drafting the rescript. Sakomizu emphasized that the emperor made the decision to broadcast the capitulation message personally; see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, 6:702–8. (Henceforth this basic documentary series is cited as FRUS.) The most convenient compilation of Japanese sources on this matter — and on Emperor Hirohito generally — is a thick, two-volume collection edited by Tsurumi Shunsuke and Nakagawa Roppei; see Tenno Hyakuwa (Tokyo: Chikuma Bunko, 1989), esp. vol. 1, pp. 683–99, which includes the full text of the rescript (697–99) as well as corraborative testimony regarding the emperor's initiatory role (690). The text itself passed through several hands, including review by two academic specialists in classical Chinese who not only checked for proper cadence and grammar, but also suggested apt classical phrases; ibid., pp. 684–87. For many decades, the basic accounts of the surrender in English remained two early publications: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), and Robert J. C. Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954). These accounts have been critically revised in Herbert Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation," Diplomatic History 19.2 (spring 1995): 197–225. 3. For samples of this familiar argument, see the editorial in Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 1945; letter to Asahi Shimbun, October 21, 1945; and Hidaka Rokuro, Gendai Ideorogii (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1960), pp. 230–31. 4. The fear that revolutionary upheaval would accompany defeat was conveyed to the emperor in the famous "Konoe Memorial" in February 1945. On these fears, see John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), chs. 7 and 8; also "Sensational Rumors, Seditious Graffiti, and the Nightmares of the Thought Police," in Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays, by John W. Dower (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 101–54. 5. Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi kankei Bunsho (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), p. 137. 6. In the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than three hundred army and fifty navy personnel committed suicide; Kusayanagi Daizo, Naimusho tai Senryogun (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1987), p. 16. By another calculation, between the emperor's broadcast and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians, took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat; Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 1:714–16. 7. Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 34 (on Grew). See also Roger Buckley, "Britain and the Emperor: The Foreign Office and Constitutional Reform in Japan, 1945–1946," Modern Asian Studies 12.4 (1978): 557–58, and Shigemitsu's account of these events in Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 2:23–25. 8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
2. As a general rule, confidential Japanese accounts of the emperor's activities must be treated with great caution in that they rely on notations and recollections by close aides devoted to burnishing his image. The earliest official account of high-level activities leading up to the emperor's broadcast was conveyed to U.S. occupation authorities in November 1945 by Sakomizu Hisatsune, chief secretary to the cabinet at the time of surrender and personally involved in drafting the rescript. Sakomizu emphasized that the emperor made the decision to broadcast the capitulation message personally; see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, 6:702–8. (Henceforth this basic documentary series is cited as FRUS.) The most convenient compilation of Japanese sources on this matter — and on Emperor Hirohito generally — is a thick, two-volume collection edited by Tsurumi Shunsuke and Nakagawa Roppei; see Tenno Hyakuwa (Tokyo: Chikuma Bunko, 1989), esp. vol. 1, pp. 683–99, which includes the full text of the rescript (697–99) as well as corraborative testimony regarding the emperor's initiatory role (690). The text itself passed through several hands, including review by two academic specialists in classical Chinese who not only checked for proper cadence and grammar, but also suggested apt classical phrases; ibid., pp. 684–87. For many decades, the basic accounts of the surrender in English remained two early publications: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), and Robert J. C. Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954). These accounts have been critically revised in Herbert Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation," Diplomatic History 19.2 (spring 1995): 197–225. 3. For samples of this familiar argument, see the editorial in Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 1945; letter to Asahi Shimbun, October 21, 1945; and Hidaka Rokuro, Gendai Ideorogii (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1960), pp. 230–31. 4. The fear that revolutionary upheaval would accompany defeat was conveyed to the emperor in the famous "Konoe Memorial" in February 1945. On these fears, see John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), chs. 7 and 8; also "Sensational Rumors, Seditious Graffiti, and the Nightmares of the Thought Police," in Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays, by John W. Dower (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 101–54. 5. Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi kankei Bunsho (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), p. 137. 6. In the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than three hundred army and fifty navy personnel committed suicide; Kusayanagi Daizo, Naimusho tai Senryogun (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1987), p. 16. By another calculation, between the emperor's broadcast and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians, took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat; Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 1:714–16. 7. Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 34 (on Grew). See also Roger Buckley, "Britain and the Emperor: The Foreign Office and Constitutional Reform in Japan, 1945–1946," Modern Asian Studies 12.4 (1978): 557–58, and Shigemitsu's account of these events in Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 2:23–25. 8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
3. For samples of this familiar argument, see the editorial in Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 1945; letter to Asahi Shimbun, October 21, 1945; and Hidaka Rokuro, Gendai Ideorogii (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1960), pp. 230–31. 4. The fear that revolutionary upheaval would accompany defeat was conveyed to the emperor in the famous "Konoe Memorial" in February 1945. On these fears, see John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), chs. 7 and 8; also "Sensational Rumors, Seditious Graffiti, and the Nightmares of the Thought Police," in Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays, by John W. Dower (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 101–54. 5. Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi kankei Bunsho (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), p. 137. 6. In the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than three hundred army and fifty navy personnel committed suicide; Kusayanagi Daizo, Naimusho tai Senryogun (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1987), p. 16. By another calculation, between the emperor's broadcast and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians, took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat; Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 1:714–16. 7. Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 34 (on Grew). See also Roger Buckley, "Britain and the Emperor: The Foreign Office and Constitutional Reform in Japan, 1945–1946," Modern Asian Studies 12.4 (1978): 557–58, and Shigemitsu's account of these events in Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 2:23–25. 8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
4. The fear that revolutionary upheaval would accompany defeat was conveyed to the emperor in the famous "Konoe Memorial" in February 1945. On these fears, see John W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878–1954 (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979), chs. 7 and 8; also "Sensational Rumors, Seditious Graffiti, and the Nightmares of the Thought Police," in Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays, by John W. Dower (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 101–54. 5. Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi kankei Bunsho (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), p. 137. 6. In the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than three hundred army and fifty navy personnel committed suicide; Kusayanagi Daizo, Naimusho tai Senryogun (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1987), p. 16. By another calculation, between the emperor's broadcast and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians, took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat; Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 1:714–16. 7. Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 34 (on Grew). See also Roger Buckley, "Britain and the Emperor: The Foreign Office and Constitutional Reform in Japan, 1945–1946," Modern Asian Studies 12.4 (1978): 557–58, and Shigemitsu's account of these events in Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 2:23–25. 8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
5. Kido Koichi, Kido Koichi kankei Bunsho (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1966), p. 137. 6. In the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than three hundred army and fifty navy personnel committed suicide; Kusayanagi Daizo, Naimusho tai Senryogun (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1987), p. 16. By another calculation, between the emperor's broadcast and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians, took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat; Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 1:714–16. 7. Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 34 (on Grew). See also Roger Buckley, "Britain and the Emperor: The Foreign Office and Constitutional Reform in Japan, 1945–1946," Modern Asian Studies 12.4 (1978): 557–58, and Shigemitsu's account of these events in Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 2:23–25. 8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
6. In the immediate wake of the defeat, it was estimated that more than three hundred army and fifty navy personnel committed suicide; Kusayanagi Daizo, Naimusho tai Senryogun (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko, 1987), p. 16. By another calculation, between the emperor's broadcast and October 1948, a total of 527 army and navy men, plus a small number of civilians, took their lives as a gesture of responsibility for the defeat; Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 1:714–16. 7. Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 34 (on Grew). See also Roger Buckley, "Britain and the Emperor: The Foreign Office and Constitutional Reform in Japan, 1945–1946," Modern Asian Studies 12.4 (1978): 557–58, and Shigemitsu's account of these events in Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 2:23–25. 8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
7. Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts," in Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Press, 1984), p. 34 (on Grew). See also Roger Buckley, "Britain and the Emperor: The Foreign Office and Constitutional Reform in Japan, 1945–1946," Modern Asian Studies 12.4 (1978): 557–58, and Shigemitsu's account of these events in Tsurumi and Nakagawa, 2:23–25. 8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
8. The various texts and speeches pertaining to the formal surrender are reprinted in the September 2, 1945 issue of the New York Times. The positive Japanese response is noted, among other sources, in Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, ed., Showa "Hatsugen" no Kiroku (Tokyo: TokYu Agency, 1989), pp. 100–1. 9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
9. General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon: The Story of the Sixth Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p. 339. 10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
10. Nihon Jaønarizumu KenkYukai, pp. 100–1; New York Times, September 12, 1945. MacArthur went on to note that Japan might reemerge as the commercial leader of Asia, but could never become a leading world power. Several weeks later, Fleet Admiral William Halsey (after expressing regret that the war "ended too soon because there are too many Nips left") declared that if MacArthur's policies were carried out, "Japan will never rise above a fifth or sixth place power"; New York Times, September 25, 1995. 11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
11. U.S. Department of the Army, Reports of General MacArthur, volume 1, supplement, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army; originally prepared by MacArthur's General Staff in 1950, but not published until 1966), p. 131. On September 21, MacArthur was again widely quoted as telling the president of the United Press that Japan's "punishment for her sins, which is just beginning, will be long and bitter." He took this occasion to reemphasize that the country could "never again" become a world power; New York Times, September 22, 1945. 12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
12. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., memorandum for the president, October 19, 1945, Box 182, President's Secretary File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo. I am grateful to Miura Yoichi for providing me with a copy of this memorandum. 13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
13. The most-often quoted single observation made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was that Japan "certainly" would have been forced to capitulate by the end of 1945, and "in all probability" prior to November 1, "even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated"; see the Survey's Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1946), p. 26, and also by the Survey, Japan's Struggle to End the War (July 1946), p. 13. Whether this was correct is a matter of dispute. 14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
14. The basic cumulative set of data on war damages in Japan was issued by the Economic Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) in April 1949 and has been widely reproduced. See, for example, the official okurasho (Ministry of Finance) history of the occupation period, Sengo Zaisei Shi (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimbun, 1978), vol. 19, pp. 15–19. 15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
15. See Dower, Japan in War and Peace, pp. 121–22, for fuller statistical detail and annotation. 16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
16. FRUS 1946, 8:165. See also okurasho, op. cit., and Takafusa Nakamura, The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), p. 15. None of these calculations include the loss of Japan's Asian empire, in which vast private and public resources had been invested over the course of some four decades. 17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
17. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1948), p. 40. See also William C. Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of Maj. Gen. Wm. C. Chase (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 127. 18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
18. See, for example, Brines, pp. 26, 39–40, 117. 19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
19. Harry Emerson Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and Its Aftermath (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 2. A vivid description of such scenes in Osaka appears in Osaka Hyakunen Shi, edited and published by Osaka-fu [Osaka Prefecture] (Osaka, 1968), p. 907.
